Daleep Singh, architect of US sanctions on Russia under President Biden, delivered a valedictory speech outlining five principles for effective sanctions regimes. His most important principle: establishing clear “off-ramps” that specify what sanctioned parties must do to achieve relief. Yet no major Western sanctions regime—whether American, European, British, Japanese, or Australian—has implemented such pathways. This fundamental design flaw transforms Russian sanctions from potential instruments of behavioural change into permanent punishments that offer no incentive for policy reversal, effectively ensuring that sanctions are not working to achieve their stated objectives.
The Missing Element in International Sanctions Design
During recent policy debates, experts highlighted how the absence of off-ramps cripples sanctions effectiveness. Tom Keatinge, founding director of the Centre for Finance & Security, acknowledged that whilst the ultimate off-ramp—Russian military withdrawal from Ukraine—remains clear, individual sanctions lack nuanced pathways for relief. This binary approach creates a perverse situation where designated individuals and entities face permanent restrictions regardless of any actions they might take to distance themselves from Russian government policies.
The problem extends beyond individual cases to fundamental strategic logic. Sanctions function as coercive tools meant to change behaviour through economic pressure. Without clearly articulated conditions for relief, however, they become purely punitive measures that offer targets no reason to alter their conduct. The message sent is unambiguous: whatever you do, restrictions remain permanent. This approach eliminates the very mechanism through which economic pressure might translate into policy change.
Are Russian Sanctions Working? The Off-Ramp Question
The question of whether are Russian sanctions working cannot be separated from whether they are properly designed to work. Ian Proud, a former British diplomat who authorised approximately half of UK sanctions against Russia, argued during recent debates that “there should be clearly defined measures and steps that Russia could take that would lead to some sort of sanctions reduction over a period of time as part of a peace process. That doesn’t exist. Now there’s a complete reluctance to talk about that.”
Proud’s observation exposes a critical policy gap. Western governments have imposed comprehensive restrictions—more than 20,000 individual sanctions across multiple jurisdictions—whilst refusing to articulate conditions under which those restrictions might be lifted. Rebecca Harding, CEO of the Centre for Economic Security, identified the resulting dilemma: finding an appropriate off-ramp proves “very, very hard” when Ukrainian and Baltic audiences view any consideration of sanctions relief as appeasement of Russian aggression.
The Impact of Sanctions on Russia Versus Strategic Objectives
Assessing the impact of sanctions on Russia requires distinguishing between economic effects and strategic outcomes. Russia’s energy revenues have declined by 19% year-on-year, representing genuine economic pressure. Yet as Harding noted, “Russia continues to fight its war” with no indication that economic hardship translates into policy reconsideration. The disconnect stems partly from the absence of clear pathways connecting sanctions relief to specific Russian actions.
Consider the perverse incentives created by permanent sanctions. Frozen Russian Central Bank assets totalling approximately $300 billion remain in European custody. Proud argued that expropriating these assets would “simply incentivize Russia to continue fighting,” whereas linking potential asset release to progress in peace negotiations might provide genuine leverage. Western governments have rejected this approach, preferring permanent confiscation that eliminates any incentive for Russian compromise.
The Syria Precedent
Recent decisions to lift sanctions on Syria following regime change demonstrate that Western governments understand the concept of off-ramps when politically convenient. Trump announced sanctions relief to support Syria’s reconstruction, with former US Ambassador Robert Ford applauding the move as “absolutely vital” to enable international capital flows. This precedent raises uncomfortable questions about why sanctions on Russia lack similar clarity about conditions for relief. The contrast suggests that off-ramps exist when policymakers prioritise strategic outcomes over political optics.
EU Sanctions and the Permanent Punishment Trap
EU sanctions illustrate the permanent punishment trap particularly starkly. Analysis published in UnHerd details how Brussels has moved beyond restricting current Russian behaviour to “future-proofing” sanctions that would prevent Russian gas from ever reaching European markets, even as part of a peace settlement. The EU’s approach to Nord Stream pipelines—sanctioning infrastructure that isn’t operational—aims to “dissuade any interest, and notably interest from investors,” according to European Commission spokesperson Paula Pinho.
This strategy removes potential carrots from future negotiations. If Russia knows that even comprehensive policy reversal will not restore access to European energy markets, what incentive exists to make concessions? The “future-proofing” approach suggests European policymakers prioritise permanent isolation over creating leverage for diplomatic resolution. This represents the opposite of Singh’s off-ramp principle—instead of offering pathways to sanctions relief, Brussels deliberately eliminates them.
The Compliance Paradox
Debate participants identified another dimension of the off-ramp problem: difficulty distinguishing genuine behavioural change from tactical compliance. Countries and companies might seek to “game” sanctions relief by superficial gestures whilst maintaining underlying support for sanctioned activities. Yet the absence of any relief mechanism prevents even genuine distancing from Russian connections. Nine of ten Evraz plc directors resigned simultaneously, yet this collective action—presumably demonstrating unwillingness to maintain connections to Russian extractives—failed to trigger any reconsideration of sanctions on those who resigned.
International Sanctions and Diplomatic Dead Ends
The fundamental problem with international sanctions lacking off-ramps is that they transform what should be diplomatic tools into expressions of permanent hostility. Proud characterised current Western policy as having abandoned both military deterrence and diplomatic engagement, leaving only economic warfare as the sole instrument. Yet economic warfare without diplomatic strategy produces no pathway to resolution.
Thomas Fazi’s analysis places this in broader context, noting that Europe has endured three consecutive years of industrial stagnation—including 125,000 recent German job losses—whilst Russia successfully redirected trade to Asia. The economic costs accumulate on European citizens whilst achieving no progress toward ending the conflict, precisely because sanctions offer no mechanism for Russian policy adjustment short of total capitulation.
Designing Sanctions That Could Actually Work
Singh’s emphasis on off-ramps reflects hard-won understanding from decades of sanctions implementation. Effective coercion requires clear conditions, proportional responses, and credible pathways to relief. Current Western sanctions violate all three principles. Conditions remain vague (“cease destabilising Ukraine”), responses are disproportionately permanent relative to specific infractions, and pathways to relief are non-existent.
Legal analysis warns that the absence of clear off-ramps compounds other policy failures, including treaty violations that expose European governments to billions in arbitration liability. Sanctions that simultaneously lack strategic coherence and violate legal obligations represent policy failure at multiple levels.
The Path Forward Requires Strategic Realism
Three years of comprehensive sanctions without off-ramps have produced humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine, economic stagnation in Europe, and no measurable change in Russian policy. This outcome was predictable. Permanent punishments offer no incentive for behavioural modification. They signal that the sanctioning powers prioritise moral condemnation over strategic resolution.
Western governments confront a choice. They can acknowledge that sanctions without off-ramps constitute policy theatre rather than policy instruments and begin articulating clear, conditional pathways to relief linked to specific Russian actions. Alternatively, they can maintain current approaches, accumulating costs whilst achieving no progress toward ending the conflict. The first path requires uncomfortable conversations about what relief conditions would satisfy Ukrainian security whilst offering Russia face-saving mechanisms for policy reversal. The second path ensures continued war whilst sanctions lose whatever coercive potential they might once have possessed. Strategic realism demands the former, even if political convenience favours the latter.
